Three major elections in June and July reshuffled the European political scene, with possible effects on the direction of migration policymaking. Across the continent, the far right achieved major victories in the European elections, especially in France, Germany, and Italy. The UK general election, by contrast, saw the Labour party claim power for the first time in 14 years. And after a strong showing by the far-right National Rally during the first round of legislative elections in France, the left coalition was a surprise winner in the second, definitive round—though no group ended up with enough seats to form a government outright.
While the growing influence of the far right in many countries partially reflects public disquiet on migration, the new leadership in London and in Paris as well as the continuity in Brussels, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen re-elected last week, could offer a window for greater European cohesion and creativity on immigration policy. A more united voice would be especially important in the event of a second Trump presidency, which could seek to further shake the foundations of international protection.
The current political dynamics in Europe could pave the way for a new era in UK-EU cooperation, structured around the goal of building a more orderly migration and asylum system and preventing deaths at sea. At least 20 people have lost their lives trying to cross the Channel since the beginning of the year; more than 800 have disappeared in the Mediterranean.
Shared Challenges
Immigration is not the only driver for the far right’s gains in Europe, but disorderly arrivals are having an outsized impact on public trust. Reception and housing systems in countries across Europe are under immense pressure. Asylum backlogs continue to mount, making it harder to ultimately return people who do not gain the right to stay. And social tensions between migrant and host communities have intensified, as evidence by repeated attacks against shelters hosting asylum seekers.
There is a sense of enough is enough. The current system is forcing asylum seekers and other migrants to take enormous risks to reach European soil, and the perception of loss of control has become a political boulder large enough to fell sitting governments. In response, a remarkable level of consensus has opened up on both sides of the Channel on the need to speed asylum processing to ensure people with valid claims can get protection swiftly, increase the returns of those with no right to stay, and expand legal migration pathways for protection, work, study, or family unification while cracking down on smugglers and human traffickers.
Both the European Union and United Kingdom are entering a phase of generational reforms on these elements, but neither side has sufficiently prioritized UK-EU cooperation. The Labour Party’s manifesto barely touched on EU cooperation, for instance. At the EU level, the new policy framework, the Pact on Migration and Asylum, seeks to address many of these issues, for instance by making it possible to apply expedited procedures to asylum seekers from countries with low recognition rates or who present a security risk. But at present, the new architecture does not foresee interlinkages with the UK system.
To deliver on their promise, both sides will need to rekindle their relationship and invest in other elements of a safe and orderly system—and make the case to publics, not just elites.
Three Priorities for UK-EU Cooperation
Cooperation hit a standstill after the formal withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2020, as migration and asylum cooperation was left out of the agreement regulating relations post-Brexit. As such, the United Kingdom lost the ability (under the Dublin system) to transfer asylum seekers to the European country where they had first entered. Already before the July election, there were signs that this deadlock was beginning to shift. EU-UK cooperation has been growing on issues such as border management and the fight against human smuggling, reflected in the recent UK-Frontex working arrangement. Other bilateral initiatives with EU Member States or multicountry dialogues such as the Calais Group reflected joint interest in reviving engagements.
Three principles could shape this engagement, with possible impacts for the broader international migration landscape:
1. Restore operational and diplomatic cooperation. Reaching an agreement on returning asylum seekers to Europe remains a top priority for the UK government—and an important element for any realistic attempt to reduce small boat crossings. But the European Union has limited bandwidth to engage in another round of negotiations, as all attention is focused on the implementation of the EU pact. Promoting new areas of cooperation could create the conditions for broader negotiations, while simultaneously achieving economies of scale.
For instance, addressing the “permabacklog” of national asylum systems, as the new UK government has termed it, is a top priority for both sides as hundreds of thousands of people languish waiting for a first decision. The United Kingdom and the European Union could share lessons on digitizing their asylum systems to achieve efficiencies, which could run the gamut from automating registration to employing artificial intelligence to minimize bias in asylum judgments.
Return and reintegration of migrants who do not have the right to stay represents another possible area for restoring UK-EU cooperation. Both sides have encountered major difficulties when carrying out forced returns, and most return orders are not enforced. Both are testing alternative approaches through assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs. Some progress has been made: in the United Kingdom, voluntary returns are more than double the number of forced returns. Reintegration assistance remains, however, largely insufficient. The European Union and the United Kingdom could achieve better results by aligning their capacity-building efforts in countries of origin, for example to improve psychosocial support for returnees. These strengthened engagements with origin countries could, in turn, ease sensitive discussions with EU and UK governments on readmission.
2. Combine new funding and diplomatic weight to tackle displacement and irregular migration. Western governments have often sought to use development funding to create alternatives to irregular migration and reduce the onward movement of refugees. David Lammy, the new UK Foreign Secretary, recently announced a desire to use aid to tackle root causes of migration. Much has been learned on the EU side about the limitations of such an approach, and European policymakers now recognize vocational training and job creation alone are insufficient to keep youth in their home countries. However, there are opportunities to cooperate on refugee responses and more strategically align migration and development objectives.
As reported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 75 percent of refugees are hosted in low- and middle-income countries. The protection space in these host countries is shrinking, marked by restrictions on basic rights, incidents of violence, and even pushbacks at borders—all while humanitarian and development responses face record funding gaps. With the now-discarded UK-Rwanda deal, a perception took hold that the UK government was evading international responsibility, in particular after Brexit and the rebuffing of EU rules. This was reinforced by the United Kingdom decreasing its support for refugee responses abroad, moving chunks of its overseas development aid to fund the reception of asylum seekers at home.
The new Labour government has an opportunity to work with the European Union to support the countries that host most refugees worldwide. This commitment will be particularly timely if the United States, currently the largest donor to UNHCR, cuts funding for refugee responses under a second Trump administration. Since 2015, host countries and the international community have made considerable progress rolling out inclusive services and innovations such as private-sector engagement and local partnerships, for instance, the Dutch-funded PROSPECTS program that helps refugees and youth access jobs in Kenya’s digital economy. Many of these interventions are funded by the European Union and its Member States, but more support is needed and the United Kingdom could help expand these programs.
Moreover, the United Kingdom brings important diplomatic clout to the regions where these programs are underway, mainly in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Since 2015, the international community has made sizeable investments in countries such as Jordan and Ethiopia, but these governments have repeatedly complained they need additional donor commitments before they can further advance refugee-friendly policies, for instance the issuance of work permits. Typically, countries of first asylum request private investments and long-term support for higher education and training before they accept to fully open their labor markets to refugees. The UK government could help steer some conversations with EU delegations and European embassies, to ensure aid for refugee initiatives is more systematically linked to policy reforms. Thus, a new EU-UK coalition could help secure sustainable funding and ensure host countries are persuaded to uphold refugee rights and build up their own asylum capacity.
3. Support innovation and scale safe pathways in Europe and beyond. Western governments have experimented with new models of safe pathways in the past several years, many reaching unprecedented scale and showing their value in circumventing asylum system backlogs and enabling swift access to protection in emergency situations. The United States, for instance, has tested a nationality-based approach through a humanitarian parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, to redirect asylum seekers engaged in dangerous and irregular journeys towards lawful pathways. The U.S. government also established Safe Mobility Offices (SMOs) in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Guatemala to connect people on the move with protection, work, and other pathways to the United States, Canada, and Spain. Through the Homes for Ukrainians program, the United Kingdom has merged a nationality-based approach with community sponsorship to provide protection to Ukrainian refugees. Together with Germany and other partners, the United Kingdom is also testing options for refugee labor pathways.
Maintaining and expanding complementary protection pathways will become more important, especially if the space for traditional refugee resettlement shrinks further. In the case of a Trump presidency, the United States would likely once again dramatically cut its resettlement program and, again, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and others would need to step into greater leadership roles. Innovations around the SMO model and other approaches could be piloted, including in Northern France. These efforts would inevitably spark political friction, considering it will remain politically sensitive for the Labour government to open new pathways while the number of small boat arrivals remains high. The Resettlement Diplomacy Network, currently chaired by the United States (with the Migration Policy Institute and Pathways International comprising the network secretariat) could be a vital tool for sustaining political momentum through these rocky years, with the European Commission, Italy, and Spain among its members.
An End to Unilateralism?
After years of post-Brexit spats, political conditions may finally be ripe to revitalize EU-UK cooperation on migration. If anything, the past four years have shown unilateral approaches cannot deliver on the promise of stopping the boats. In a context where the United States could withdraw from its international engagements, a joint EU-UK front would be even more essential to respond to displacement crises and mixed migration movements around the globe.