The more than 20 million people currently estimated to comprise the Ukrainian diaspora worldwide have played a significant but often underappreciated role supporting Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. Engagement by the diaspora—including both migrants and their descendants—has evolved over time, reaching a turning point with Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and entering a new phase following the 2022 full-scale invasion. Over the last two and a half years, diaspora members have helped fundraise and support projects in Ukraine, bolster its international image, and counter Russian narratives.
Increasingly, Ukrainian leaders in Kyiv have recognized this effort and sought to foster the diaspora’s support, such as through a 2024 proposal to allow dual citizenship. “Today, the unity of Ukrainians spans both hemispheres of the Earth,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in January. “Our millions-strong diaspora [forms] our lobbyists for Ukraine’s interests around the world… who collect, find, pack, and deliver everything needed for the victory… who have not forgotten their roots and do not let the world forget about Ukraine.”
Because many diaspora networks had been built up in the years since the annexation of Crimea, they were able to swiftly mobilize after the full-scale war began. Although the money sent by individuals as formal remittances has declined since 2021, support has increased in other ways, such as through social enterprises designed to connect Ukrainian communities with the world and prepare for the post-war recovery. Moreover, the flight of an estimated 6.7 million Ukrainians since the invasion has significantly expanded the diaspora’s size and prompted new questions about its future.
Details of the Ukraine situation are unique, however other diasporas are often involved in conflict and post-conflict dynamics, even if their activities are frequently overlooked. Mapping these communities is challenging, as they include both recent migrants and multigenerational populations integrated into foreign societies. When conflicts erupt, diasporas often engage by sending humanitarian relief, raising funds, and transferring remittances, oftentimes in support of one faction or another. They can also act as peacebuilders and play crucial roles in post-conflict reconstruction.
This article provides an overview of the Ukrainian diaspora’s engagement with the homeland before and after Russia’s 2022 invasion. Based in part on the author’s research in the United Kingdom and several EU Member States, it identifies key historical contributions, the diaspora’s evolving role since 2022, and opportunities for further engagement for Ukraine’s recovery. Although the diaspora includes a significant number of people in Russia—perhaps as many as 10 million, although exact figures are debated—this discussion focuses on the diaspora in the West, particularly in Europe, where a liberal political environment fosters free expression and cross-border mobilization. The Western diaspora has significant populations in Central Europe (including Czechia, Germany, Poland, and Slovakia) as well as in Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom, among other countries in Europe, North America (Canada and the United States), and South America. This diaspora possesses the expertise, networks, and willingness to support Ukraine.
A Diaspora 150 Years in the Making
The Ukrainian diaspora formed from several waves of migration. In the late 1870s, rural residents began emigrating from areas of Eastern Europe that now comprise Ukraine to North America. Significant emigration followed Ukraine’s failed struggle for independence in the turbulent years after the Russian Revolution (from 1917-20), leading to émigré centers in cities such as Paris and Prague. Once Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union in 1922, emigration halted, even during the 1932-33 famine that killed millions of Ukrainians, known as the Holodomor. After World War II, many people fled communism, first to Western Europe and later to the Americas, particularly Canada and the United States. The Ukrainian World Congress, founded in 1967 in New York, remains a major diaspora organization, linking and supporting communities in over 60 countries.
During the Cold War, communist authorities felt threatened by emigration and responded by imposing travel restrictions, issuing propaganda, and attempting to infiltrate emigrant communities. Many Ukrainian émigrés, in turn, supported the anti-communist Captive Nations movement, and in the late 1980s backed the Rukh movement for independence and democratization. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, open borders led to a new wave of emigration, driven largely by economic and political factors.
Large segments of the diaspora maintained interest in Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratization until 1991 but began to diverge afterwards. Two major groups emerged: the derzhavnyky (statists) who supported Ukrainian statehood regardless of domestic politics, and those increasingly critical of the government’s undemocratic practices. The influence of the latter group grew significantly during the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013-14 EuroMaidan protests, which advocated for a liberal, pro-EU Ukraine.
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions galvanized the diaspora, leading to a rapid increase in Ukrainian migrant organizations, even in unexpected places such as Turkey. Identity-based projects flourished, emphasizing the teaching of Ukrainian history, language, and culture to emphasize a national identity that was separate from Russia’s. Efforts gradually expanded to include the sending of humanitarian aid. As thousands became internally displaced and emigration surged, what began as spontaneous humanitarian support evolved into long-term partnerships to provide sustained assistance.
Figure 1. Map of Ukraine
Note: Map is purely an illustration and is not intended to imply endorsement or acceptance of territorial boundaries.
Ukrainian Diaspora Engagement since 2022
Russia’s 2022 invasion drastically altered the diaspora’s engagement. Previously focused on fundraising and democracy advocacy, especially in countries such as Canada and the United States, the pre-existing diaspora was suddenly joined by approximately 6.7 million newly displaced Ukrainians, primarily women and children due to men’s conscription into the army and rules preventing those age 18-60 from leaving. This exodus significantly changed the demographic profile of Ukrainians abroad.
Programs such as the European Union’s Temporary Protection Directive, the United Kingdom’s Homes for Ukraine, and the United States’ Uniting for Ukraine quickly addressed the need for legal status and support for millions of displaced Ukrainians. They benefited from access to housing, health care, education, social welfare, and business opportunities. Germany emerged as the largest host in the West, with approximately 1.2 million Ukrainians as of October, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), followed by Poland, with 970,000 (see Table 1).
Table 1. Humanitarian Migrants from Ukraine, by Destination, 2024
Notes: Table shows the numbers of migrants forced from Ukraine since Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Numbers are rounded. Precise dates of data vary for different countries: the number for Ukrainians in Russia is as of December 31, 2023; all other numbers are from various points in 2024 and are the most recent available.
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Ukraine Refugee Situation,” accessed October 13, 2024, available online.
Large-scale acts of violence in the homeland usually trigger an immediate humanitarian response from the diaspora, and Ukraine was no exception. What distinguished this response, however, was the networks and nonprofit organizations that had been established in destination countries after the Crimea annexation, which facilitated quicker and more efficient mobilization of aid. The diaspora was also among the first to reach local areas in Ukraine that were difficult for other humanitarian actors to access. Connections with families and friends in occupied territories and close to the front lines further enhanced their ability to provide support.
There is no comprehensive accounting of the aid delivered by diaspora organizations, which has included money, food, first-aid kits, medication, clothing, blankets, and other essential supplies, as well as protective equipment for soldiers. The humanitarian effort has been global, with significant engagement from citizens of various countries who also have contributed to non-diaspora charities. Additionally, many diaspora initiatives have been informal, relying on personal connections and individual efforts. Although the Ukrainian World Congress is well established and has affiliates worldwide, the response was not centrally coordinated, and many organizations have operated independently. The Ukrainian government tried to streamline support by encouraging donations through its United24 fundraising platform, however this initiative was designed to appeal to all supporters, not just the diaspora.
Since 2022: An Evolving Picture
While humanitarian relief remains a major focus, fundraising has become increasingly challenging in the years since the invasion. This may be attributed to growing empathy fatigue and new conflicts capturing Western audiences’ attention, particularly the one in Gaza. A UK-based diaspora activist described the dynamic at an event in Warsaw in June: “Two years ago, I was able to raise £10,000 in just five days. Now, after three weeks of fundraising I’ve only managed to raise £3,000.”
Also, financial remittances—which are typically the most stable financial flows globally and a key contribution to conflict and post-conflict economies—have seen a decline. Immediately before 2022, Ukraine was the largest recipient of financial remittances in Europe and Central Asia, with individuals sending more than U.S. $18 billion via formal channels in 2021, according to the World Bank. Initial expectations that remittances would increase after Russia’s invasion did not materialize; Ukraine recorded slightly less than U.S. $15 billion in 2023 (see Figure 2). The National Bank of Ukraine attributed this drop to the fact that many family members abroad were now hosting relatives who had fled the war, thereby eliminating the need to send back money. Additionally, many in the diaspora shifted to providing humanitarian aid instead of remittances. Another explanation is that many remittance senders faced financial challenges of their own, amid rising inflation, an energy crisis, and post-pandemic pressures in many countries.
Figure 2. Remittance Flows to Ukraine, 1996-2023
Source: World Bank Group, “Personal Remittances, Received (Current US$) – Ukraine,” updated September 19, 2024, available online.
Similar fluctuating support is evident in the recruitment of Ukrainian soldiers from the diaspora. In the first month of the war, more than 66,200 Ukrainian men returned to fight for their country, Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov reported. However, heavy casualties over the last two years (the government said in February 2024 that 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed since the 2022 invasion, although other estimates are much higher) have severely depleted many military units, leading to a decline in volunteer enthusiasm and increasing pressure to expand the draft.
Many men have also found ways to leave Ukraine despite the restrictions. Of the 4.3 million Ukrainians in the European Union as of January, approximately 860,000 were men, according to Eurostat. In response, a controversial policy issued in April 2024 stopped Ukrainian consular services for men abroad. The government has also engaged in talks with European countries—particularly Poland—about returning draft-age Ukrainian male citizens to the country. A July agreement established a voluntary military unit called the Ukrainian Legion, which is open to Ukrainian citizens in the European Union, with training planned to occur in Poland. By early October, the Ukrainian Legion had begun recruiting volunteers.
Protests, Rallies, and Public Pressure
The initial diaspora-led protests held globally in 2022 were marked by shock and emotion. Events denounced Russia’s actions, emphasized civilians’ and humanitarian needs, rallied support for Ukraine’s armed forces, and demanded sanctions against Russia. Thousands of sympathizers joined demonstrations, reflecting broad international solidarity. Ukrainians worked with other diaspora groups, notably from Poland and the Baltic countries, to show a united front against Russian aggression. Protests also connected unexpected allies, such as elements of the Iranian diaspora opposed to the government in Tehran, who together condemned Iran’s increasing military aid to Russia.
As the conflict continued, protests and other public pressure became increasingly targeted. Mass demonstrations in countries across the European Union and the United States highlighted atrocities and appealed to NATO ahead of its 2023 summit in Vilnius. Protesters called for increased military aid, addressing alleged war crimes, and demanding accountability. For instance, in April 2022, Ukrainian women rallied in Berlin against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. The diaspora also played a crucial role organizing screenings of films documenting the war, notably the Academy Award-winner 20 Days in Mariupol. Diaspora members were involved with protesting Russians at War, a documentary focusing on Russian soldiers. In publications, social media, and elsewhere, diaspora activists raised awareness about Russian propaganda and promoted fact-checking strategies. The Alliance of Ukrainian Organizations and Crisis Simulation for Peace e. V (CRISP) were instrumental in organizing a conference in Germany in April 2024 that put global Ukrainians on the map of donors and investors for the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in June.
Diaspora Entrepreneurship and Social Enterprises on the Rise
Diaspora entrepreneurship has become a key outlet for supporting Ukraine. Numerous businesses have either relocated from occupied areas of Ukraine or established new operations abroad. One prominent example is Nova Post, a Kyiv-based logistics company that shifted operations to connect with the diaspora across 16 countries. Ukrainian Chambers of Commerce existed in countries such as Norway and Poland pre-war, but have significantly ramped up international activities to connect Ukrainian businesses with entrepreneurs or investors. Although large-scale investors in Europe have been relatively scarce, numerous small enterprises have emerged. Many Ukrainians have established businesses in personal care and beauty, in the service industry, and selling traditional products such as Ukrainian foods and clothes with Ukrainian embroidery. One of the most notable developments is the growth of Ukrainian IT companies, with a robust presence in countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In 2024, two Ukrainian entrepreneurs launched a 15-million-pound fund in London to identify and invest in what they describe as “untapped talent” in Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European countries.
Social entrepreneurship has also been instrumental in addressing people’s needs and rebuilding lives. Since the exodus has been dominated by women, groups such as the World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organizations have played a critical role connecting female activists abroad with those in Ukraine. Organizations such as Razom have partnered with local groups in Ukraine to repair buildings, install water filtration systems, provide power, and support farms. Others such as the Netherlands for Ukraine Foundation have sought to assist veterans undergoing rehabilitation abroad, including by purchasing prosthetics and providing psychological support. Through global telemedicine platforms including Health Tech without Borders and TeleHelp, medical professionals abroad have assisted war victims. Diaspora organizations have also initiated projects to document alleged war crimes, including Project Sunflowers, the Centre for War Crimes Documentation in Poland, and the Ukraine Legal Network in the Netherlands. Others have focused on aiding record-keeping and planning for the restoration of heritage sites. The long-running Shevchenko Scientific Society, in New York, has supported scholars, writers, and artists affected by the war. Other organizations have focused on empowering youth, particularly through education. The Ukrainian Social Venture Fund was established as a venture philanthropic organization to support social start-ups and impact investing, drawing also on the expertise of foreign-based Ukrainians. The number and variety of these types of efforts underscore the diverse roles that diaspora groups have played in supporting Ukraine during wartime and preparing for its future.
More than Two Years In, Questions Remain
In November 2023, the Ukrainian government appointed diplomat Mariana Betsa as ambassador-at-large for the global Ukrainian community, underscoring its growing emphasis on the diaspora. In January, Zelenskyy also proposed changing the constitution to allow multiple citizenships (excluding Russians; the bill has not yet passed Parliament). At the same time, the government began embracing the term “global Ukrainian community” to include both the longstanding diaspora and the more recent forcibly displaced. Events such as the June 2024 Ukrainian Recovery Conference further emphasized the importance of this community for the country. These developments could pave the way for additional transnational programs and projects.
Ukrainian leaders want displaced citizens to return. EU host governments are similarly interested in a homecoming, although details differ and some countries may be more inclined than others to think of Ukrainians as temporary residents. Many displaced Ukrainians and other members of the diaspora are caught between two worlds, facing a rise in burnout and, for Ukrainians abroad, the fact that temporary legal protections in the European Union and elsewhere are set to expire in coming years. Governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs have begun to think about long-term solutions, including at a June 2024 training led by the author and hosted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in collaboration with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development. However, many proposals are still in early stages
Among the underappreciated stakeholders in this process are diaspora entrepreneurs, whose unique connections to people and institutions in both homeland and host country might benefit Ukrainian policymakers. The author’s research has divided these groups into several categories: Brokers, Locals, Homebound, and Communal. Brokers are highly visible international bridge-builders and mediators who can communicate effectively across contexts and reach out to global organizations. In contrast, quieter Locals have developed expertise in fields such as business, health care, and city partnerships within their host countries. Homebound individuals maintain a stronger connection to their origin and are more inclined to return and mobilize others for return. And the Communal focus on community-driven projects such as humanitarian aid, education, and initiatives that extend beyond high-level politics. A diversity of engagement by these diaspora entrepreneurs can foster freedom of choice within the global Ukrainian community, allowing individuals to return, remain in host countries, or contribute to Ukraine’s recovery transnationally, and moves beyond the simplistic binary of host-state integration versus return.
Diaspora economic and social entrepreneurs are well positioned to contribute expertise in areas where reconstruction must meet evolving global standards, particularly in the context of Ukraine’s EU accession process. For instance, expertise from the diaspora in the United Kingdom played a key role in developing a road map to rebuild and decarbonize Ukraine’s steel sector—previously a major export industry—to align with the EU Green Deal, which could be instructive as the country focuses on reconstructing infrastructure and ensuring it is energy-efficient. Another example is the Mykolaiv Water Hub, which has benefitted from the involvement of the Ukrainian diaspora in Germany (among others) to transition the southern Ukraine region towards innovative water-related industries.
Importantly, diasporas often operate on the principle of translocalism, implying that locality extends beyond geographic boundaries. Diaspora members maintain close emotional and social connections with people in specific locations—such as family, friends, and wider communities in the homeland—whom they are especially motivated to support. Given the success of Ukraine’s decentralization reforms, which began before Russia’s 2022 invasion, and the increasing authority of hromadas (local administrative units) that those reforms empowered, there is now greater potential to institutionalize relationships between local Ukrainian authorities and the diaspora and global communities connected to specific places in Ukraine. The diaspora has been pivotal for Ukraine; given that the odds of peace seem far-off, innovative thinking will be required to further unlock this community’s potential and benefit communities, local businesses, NGOs, and the country writ large.
Disclaimer: This article reflects the author’s personal research and views and does not represent those of any organization.
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